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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011)
Synopsis:
In Judulang, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled the
Ninth Circuit’s approval of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) approach to deportation proceedings. Former Section 212(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), provides
for a “waiver of excludability,” permitting a non-citizen legal
resident to remain in the country in spite of a criminal conviction. In
2005, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sought to
remove Joel Judulang from the United States on the grounds that he
had committed an aggravated felony involving a crime of violence.
Such a crime, the BIA held, was not comparable to any ground for
exclusion determined by DHS and renders Section 212(c)
inapplicable. The Court found the BIA’s comparable grounds
approach to be arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Facts and Analysis:
Joel Judulang, a native of the Philippines, entered the United
States in 1974 at the age of eight, and has lived continuously in the
U.S. as a lawful permanent resident.1 In 1988, Judulang was
involved in a fight where a person was shot and killed.2 Subsequent
to being charged as an accessory, Judulang pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and received a six year suspended sentence.3 In 2005,
Judulang pled guilty to another criminal offense involving theft.4
Shortly thereafter, DHS commenced deportation proceedings.5
Judulang was charged with having committed an “aggravated
felony” involving “a crime of violence,” premised on the 1988
manslaughter conviction, pursuant to U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F),
1

Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 (2011).
Id. at 483.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
2
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1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).6 The administrative law judge ordered
deportation, and the BIA affirmed on appeal.7 In the latter
proceeding, the BIA considered whether Judulang could make use of
what is known as section 212(c) relief.8 Under this provision,
immigration authorities deploy the comparable grounds approach by
which they look to the statutory ground which DHS has determined
to be a basis for exclusion; and, provided the charges do not fall
outside DHS’s list, the alien is eligible for discretionary relief.9 From
there, the analyses turns on such factors as: “the seriousness of the
offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration
of the alien's residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the
number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in
the Armed Forces.”10
The BIA held that Judulang could not invoke section 212(c)
relief because “crime[s] of violence” are grounds for deportation not
comparable to any of DHS’s exclusion grounds.11 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review in reliance on the
circuit’s precedents upholding BIA's comparable grounds
approach.12 Justice Kagan described the comparable grounds
approach as such:
Those mathematically inclined might think of the
comparable-grounds approach as employing Venn
diagrams. Within one circle are all the criminal
offenses composing the particular ground of
deportation charged. Within other circles are the
offenses composing the various exclusion grounds.
When, but only when, the “deportation circle”
sufficiently corresponds to one of the “exclusion
circles” may an alien apply for § 212(c) relief.13

6

Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 481.
10 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 483.
12 Id.
13 Id.
7
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The Supreme Court granted cert in order to resolve a split
among the circuits as to whether the BIA’s approach is proper.14
Holding:
The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the BIA’s
interpretation of the law regarding eligibility for section 212(c) relief,
stating that “the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned
manner.”15 Given that DHS has charged a lawful permanent resident
with being removable for having been convicted of an aggravated
felony, and the offense is not specifically named as a ground of
inadmissibility, the Court held that the BIA’s approach is arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act.16 The case
was remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”17 While the Court did not
put forth a preferred approach, the judgment effectively throws out
the comparable grounds approach.18
The Court reasoned that the comparable grounds approach is
not premised on any considerations pertinent to whether an alien
should be deported.19 In effect, the BIA’s current approach dictates
who should be eligible for discretionary relief by utilizing a
comparison that rests upon diverse statutory categories.20 As a result,
the BIA’s analysis reflects no relation to the goals of the deportation
process.21 Further, such a policy will lead to aliens who are similarly
situated being treated significantly different for reasons divorced
from the policy behind deportation.22 The Court stressed that the
BIA's approach must not remain “unmoored from the purposes and
concerns of the immigration laws.”23

14

Id. at 483.
Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484.
16 Id. at 487.
17 Id. at 490.
18 Id. at 485-87.
19 Id. at 485.
20 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485.
21 Id. at 485-87.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 490.
15
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Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012)
Synopsis:
Reynolds addressed a provision of the federal Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act, a provision which requires
convicted sex offenders to provide state governments with current
information for state and federal sex offender registries. Reynolds,
whose offence pre-dated the Act, registered in Missouri in 2005 but
moved to Pennsylvania in September 2007 without informing the
authorities in Missouri or Pennsylvania. Upon being indicted,
Reynolds moved to dismiss arguing that that the Act was not
applicable to pre-Act offenders during the time at issue. The District
Court rejected Reynolds' motion, and the Third Circuit concluded
that the registration requirements applied to pre-Act offenders. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that pre-Act offenders need not
register before the Attorney General validly specifies that the Act's
registration provisions apply to that particular population.
Facts and Analysis:
Petitioner Billy Joe Reynolds committed a sex offense that
predates the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act.24 The present case arose when Reynolds was charged with
violating the Act by failing to register between September 16 and
October 16, 2007.25 After serving four years in prison for his original
offense, in July 2005 Reynolds registered as a Missouri sex
offender.26 Subsequently, Reynolds moved to Pennsylvania where he
failed to update his Missouri registration information and register
anew in Pennsylvania.27 A federal grand jury indicted him, charging
him with having “knowingly failed to register and update a
registration as required by [the Act].”28

24 Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 979 (2012); 120 Stat. 590, 42
U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. III).
25 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 979.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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Reynolds filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that in
September and October 2007 the federal registration requirements
had yet to come into effect with respect to pre-Act offenders.29 The
Act had become law earlier in July 2006 and the Attorney General
had already promulgated an Interim Rule making the registration
requirements applicable to pre-Act offenders.30 Nevertheless,
Reynolds’ motion maintained that the Interim Rule was invalid as it
violated the Constitution's “nondelegation” doctrine and the
Administrative Procedure Act's “good cause” requirement for
promulgating a rule without “notice and comment.”31
Reynolds' legal argument was rejected by the District Court
on the merits.32 On appeal, the Third Circuit never addressed the
merits because it found that even in the absence of any initiative by
the Attorney General the Act required Reynolds and pre-Act
offenders to follow the registration requirements.33 Approximately
half of the circuit courts disagree as they have held that the Act's
registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders
notwithstanding direction from the Attorney General.34 Recognizing
the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the
issue.35
Holding:
The Supreme Court found that the federal Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act’s registration requirements do not
apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General so specifies.36
Finding that the Attorney General's Interim Rule matters as to the
resolution of Reynolds’s case, the Court reversed the Third Circuit's
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion.37
29

Id. at 979-80.
Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 980.
36 Id. at 984.
37 Id.
30
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The Court first explained that a natural reading of the law
supports the conclusion. The first part of the law states that “[a] sex
offender shall register, and keep the registration current,” while it
states later that “[t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to
specify the applicability of the requirements . . . to sex offenders
convicted before the enactment . . . .”38 As such, it was reasoned that
the latter provision should control the law’s application to that
particular group of offenders.39 Further, the Court reasoned, the
holding comports with congressional concerns about the application
of the registration requirement to pre-Act offenders and Congress’s
intention of allowing the Attorney General to supplement what the
Court referred to as “potential lacunae,” or gaps in the law.40
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, finding
that the Act required registration of pre-Act offenders through its
own language arguing that the Attorney General was delegated only
authority to exempt pre-Act offenders from the registration
requirements.41 Justice Scalia challenged the majority directly,
stating that his was the more natural reading of the law.42 Ultimately,
the dissenting Justices would have counted the non-delegation
principle against a power to activate because the power to exempt
avoids the constitutional problem and is more consistent with the
traditional discretion held by prosecutors.43
Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency,
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)
Synopsis:
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held in Sackett
v. EPA that persons subject to cease and desist orders issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Clean Water
Act may challenge the order by going directly to federal court. Upon
receiving a compliance order from the EPA pursuant to the Clean
38

Id. at 981.
Id.
40 Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 982.
41 Id. at 985-87.
42 Id.
43 Id.
39
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Water Act, the Sacketts sought declarative and injunctive relief in a
federal District Court invoking the Administrative Procedure Act.
The District Court dismissed the action claiming a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the
Clean Water Act precluded pre-enforcement judicial review. The
Supreme Court reversed holding that the order at issue was a final
agency action allowing for judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Facts and Analysis:
Michael and Chantell Sackett owned a residential lot in Idaho,
which they filled, in part, with dirt and rock.44 Upon becoming aware
of the filling activity, the EPA issued an administrative compliance
order pursuant to the Clean Water Act.45 The EPA made a
determination that the Sacketts had violated the Clean Water Act
because their lot contained wetlands under the EPA's regulatory
jurisdiction.46 The order required the Sacketts to immediately restore
the wetlands and provide the EPA access to the site and all
documents pertinent to its conditions.47
Maintaining that their property was not subject to the EPA
regulations, the Sacketts requested a hearing with the EPA, which
was denied.48 The Sacketts then filed an action in federal District
Court making claims pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.49 The lower
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because there was no “final agency action” which makes judicial
review permissible.50 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed stating
that the Clean Water Act “preclude[s] pre-enforcement judicial
review of compliance orders” and adding that such preclusion of

44

Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).
Id. at 1370-71.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1371.
48 Id.
49 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
50 Id.
45
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judicial review does not violate the Sacketts’ due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment.51
Holding:
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Sacketts could
challenge the EPA's administrative compliance order in a U.S.
District Court.52 However, the Court did not decide on the merits as
to whether the property in question contains wetland regulated under
the Clean Water Act nor as to the Sacketts’ due process rights.53
Holding on more narrow grounds, the Court found that the EPA's
administrative order was immediately subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedures Act.54
The Court held that an administrative compliance order
represents a “final agency action,” a prerequisite for judicial
review.55 Well established precedent provides that an agency action
is final if it: 1) determines rights or obligations, or is an action from
which legal consequences flow, and 2) marks the consummation of
the agency's decision-making process.56 As such, the Court held that
the EPA’s order to the Sacketts determined their rights or obligations
as it created a legal obligation to restore the property and would have
given the EPA access to the site and to the Sacketts’ documents.57
Correspondingly, the EPA’s action created legal consequences by
exposing the Sacketts to daily penalties in addition to other negative
impacts.58 Further, the Court reasoned that the order was a
consummation of the agency's decision-making process because the
Sacketts had no recourse to further agency review.59 The Court also
held that the Clean Water Act does not preclude judicial review

51

Id.
Id. at 1374.
53 Id.
54 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
55 Id. at 1373.
56 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997); Port of Boston
Marine Terminal Ass’n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970).
57 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
58 Id.
59 Id.
52
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because the Administrative Procedures Act creates a presumption of
judicial review with respect to administrative agency actions.60
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
EME Homer City Generation, LP v. Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
Synopsis:
In EME Homer City Generation, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granted a stay on the implementation of
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) latest, and
controversial, air pollution rule. A group of power companies
challenged the rule arguing it placed an undue financial burden on
power producers. The per curium order was handed down forty-eight
hours before the rule was to come into effect and stated only that the
petitioners had met the requirements for a stay. The court emphasized
that the order was not a decision on the merits, but only a delay
pending the court’s completion of its review.
Facts and Analysis:
Several private companies, in addition to the states of
Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas and Virginia, sued the EPA in federal District Court
challenging the implementation of the EPA’s Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (“the Rule”).61 The parties originally filed seven
separate cases, which had been consolidated into a single case.62
The Rule was promulgated by the EPA in 2011 pursuant to
the authority given to it under the Clean Air Act, and requires certain
states to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions in order
to reduce the impact of air quality down-wind in other states.63
60

Id. at 1373.
EME Homer City Generation, LP v. Environmental Protection Agency,
No. 11-1302, (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) [EME I].
62 Id.
63 United States v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 823 F. Supp. 2d 274,
277-78 (W.D. Pa. 2011) [EME II].
61
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Impacting a total of twenty-seven states, the Rule was scheduled to
come into effect on January 1, 2012.64 The Rule significantly
expands the EPA’s authority because, where the EPA is now limited
to only setting air quality standards, the Rule includes enforcement
provisions, a prerogative long maintained by individual state
governments.65
Plaintiffs moved to stay the Rule in an effort to prevent it
from coming into effect as scheduled.66 The challengers put forth
similar arguments demonstrating the four factors necessary for a stay
on administrative action.67 First, it was argued that plaintiffs are
likely to prevail on the merits because the promulgation is improper
without providing states the chance to create their own
implementation plans; and, the EPA’s actions were arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act.68 Second, it is
argued that the parties will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not
granted because the Rule will have a detrimental effect on state
economies and threatens their citizens’ access to affordable energy.69
Third, that there is no possibility of substantial harm to other parties
if a stay is granted as the rules already in place will remain until the
EPA can promulgate valid new rules.70 As for the final factor,
plaintiffs maintain that the public interest favors granting the motion
to stay because it will protect consumers from increases in power
rates.71
Holding:
On December 30, 2011, forty-eight hours before the Rule was
to come into effect, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stayed implementation of the EPA’s new rule.72 The Court’s
decision stays the Rule in its entirety pending completion of judicial
64

Id.
Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 290.
68 EME II, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
65

414

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-1

review.73 The order left much to the imagination as it provided little
explanation, stating only that the requirements for a stay had been
met.74 While preserving the status quo for the time being, the per
curium order is not a ruling on the merits.75 In light of the stay, the
court ordered the EPA to continue enforcing the regulation that was
set to be replaced by the Rule.76
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., v. United States,
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
In a challenge to provisions of the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, the Sixth Circuit in Discount
Tobacco largely upheld the constitutionality of the new warning label
requirements on tobacco products. The plaintiffs argued that the
burden placed upon them by the law outweighs any legitimate
government interest in conveying factual information to consumers,
and moreover, effectively overshadows and dominates plaintiffs’
speech. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that the warning
requirements are mostly valid as they materially advance the
government’s stated interest. However, the provision banning the use
of color and graphics in tobacco advertising was struck down as
“vastly overbroad.”
Facts and Analysis:
In 2009, Congress enacted, and the President signed into law,
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.77 The law
grants the power to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to
regulate tobacco products for the stated purpose of addressing “issues
of particular concern to public health officials, including the use of
tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.”78 Moreover,
73

EME II, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
Id.
75 See Id.
76 Id.
77 Pub.L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
78 Id. at § 3(2).
74

Spring 2012

Legal Summaries

415

the Act seeks “to promote cessation” of tobacco use in order “to
reduce disease risk and the social costs associated with tobaccorelated diseases.”79 The policy’s origin can be traced, in part, to a
study by the FDA, where several significant findings were reported
with respect to tobacco use among juveniles.80
In August 2009, a group of tobacco manufacturers and sellers
brought suit against the United States in federal District Court
claiming that provisions of the law: 1) violate free speech rights
under the First Amendment, 2) constitute an unlawful taking pursuant
to the Fifth Amendment, and 3) infringe on Fifth Amendment due
process rights.81 The challenged portion of the law requires the
following:
(1) that tobacco manufacturers reserve a significant
portion of tobacco packaging for the display of health
warnings, including graphic images intended to
illustrate the hazards of smoking; (2) restrictions on
the commercial marketing of so-called “modified risk
tobacco products;” (3) ban of statements that implicitly
or explicitly convey the impression that tobacco
products are approved by, or safer by virtue of being
regulated by, the FDA; (4) restriction on the
advertising of tobacco products to black text on a
white background in most media; and (5) bar on the
distribution of free samples of tobacco products in
most locations, brand-name tobacco sponsorship of
any athletic or social event, branded merchandising of
any non-tobacco product, and distribution of free items
in consideration of a tobacco purchase (i.e.,
“continuity programs”).82
The lower court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
as to the claims that the prohibition on color and graphics in
advertising and the ban on statements implying that tobacco products
79

Id. at § 3(9).
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
519 (6th Cir. 2012).
81 Id. at 521.
82 Id. at 520.
80
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are safer due to FDA regulation violated the First Amendment.83
Summary judgment was granted for the government with respect to
plaintiff’s remaining claims.84
Holding:
In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court
findings as to the validity of the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act's restrictions on the marketing of modified-risk
tobacco products; prohibition on event sponsorship, branding nontobacco merchandise, and free sampling, and the requirement that
tobacco manufacturers reserve packaging space for textual health
warnings. 85 The District Court judgment was also affirmed as to the
unconstitutionality of the law’s limitation on tobacco advertising to
black and white text.86 Lastly, the court of appeal affirmed as to the
non-graphic warning label requirement.87 On the other hand, the
lower court was reversed with respect to the following: that the
restriction on statements regarding the relative safety of tobacco
products based on FDA regulation is unconstitutional and its finding
that the law’s ban on tobacco continuity programs is permissible
under the First Amendment.88
The opinion began by highlighting the problem of juvenile
tobacco use, citing the “thousands of pages of medical studies and
governmental reports supporting the conclusion that the use of
tobacco, especially by juveniles, poses an enormous threat to the
nation's health, and imposes grave costs on the government.”89 As
such, the court stated that “[t]here can be no doubt that the
government has a significant interest in preventing juvenile smoking
and in warning the general public about the harms associated with the
use of tobacco products.”90 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that
the sale and use of tobacco by adults is a legal activity and that the
83

Id. at 521.
Id.
85 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 518.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 519.
90 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 519.
84
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tobacco industry and its consumers have an important interest in
truthful information related to the use of tobacco.91
The court found significant the lack of consumer awareness
regarding the serious health risks resulting from “the decades-long
deception by Tobacco Companies.”92 The majority then went even
further stating that it “bears emphasizing that the risks here include
the undisputed fact that Plaintiffs' products literally kill users and,
often, members of the families of users . . .”93 These sentiments led to
the conclusions that the warning requirements are “reasonably related
to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception and
are therefore constitutional.”94
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazaar,
672 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
In Alliance for the Wild Rockies, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
provision of the 2011 Appropriations Act which ordered the
Secretary of the Interior to remove a specified population of grey
wolves from Endangered Species Act's (“ESA”) protection. The law
effectively overruled an earlier court decision that found that such a
partial delisting of a species would violate the ESA. Environmental
advocacy groups challenged that law citing separation of powers,
arguing that Congress was forcing the courts to rule as it willed. The
lower court rejected this theory holding that Congress had acted
within its constitutional authority to alter the laws even when a
particular law is subject to contemporaneous litigation. The Ninth
Circuit agreed, finding that Congress had simply amended the law.
Facts and Analysis:
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) has, on
numerous occasions, attempted to exclude a distinct population of
grey wolves found in the northern Rocky Mountains from federal
91

Id. at 520.
Id. at 562.
93 Id. at 596.
94 Id.
92
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protections under the ESA pursuant to its rule making authority.95 In
its latest effort, a District Court struck down the rule because the
ESA did not permit partial delisting of a distinct population of a
protected species.96 While that case was pending before an appeals
court, proponents of the delisting turned to Congress which altered
the ESA in section 1713 of an appropriations bill signed into law on
April 15, 2011.97 Section 1713 requires the Secretary of the Interior
to reissue the delisting rule “without regard to any other provision of
statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule.”98 Further,
the Secretary “shall not be subject to judicial review . . . .”99
In May 2011, the FWS complied with Section 1713 and
reissued the rule delisting the specified population of grey wolves.100
A group of environmental activists filed the present action in a
federal District Court claiming that Section 1713 was
unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine.101 The
plaintiffs relied heavily United States v. Klein, which held that
Congress unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers
doctrine by directing the Court to make a factual finding regarding
the probative weight of a presidential pardon.102 The District Court
Judge was notably sympathetic to the claim stating that, “Section
1713 sacrifices the spirit of the ESA to appease a vocal political
faction.”103 Notwithstanding, the lower court conceded that “the
wisdom of that choice is not now before this Court,” and
begrudgingly granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs.104

95 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 672 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)
[Alliance II].
96 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.
Mont. 2010).
97 See Pub. L. 112–10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 C.F.R. Part 17, 76 Fed. Reg. 25, 590 (2011).
101 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D.
Mont. 2011) [Alliance I].
102 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
103 Alliance I, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
104 Id.
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Holding:
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that
Section 1713 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.105 The
court was under no illusions and noted that Congress had changed the
law applicable to a particular case before the courts.106 However, the
court reasoned that the judiciary was not being directed by Congress
to reach a particular outcome, but rather was free to apply the new
applicable law to the facts of the case.107 As such, it was held that
Section 1713 merely constituted an amendment of the law which
courts are bound to follow.108
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a violation of the separation of
power doctrine occurs where, (1) Congress has impermissibly
directed certain findings in pending litigation, without changing any
underlying law, or (2) a challenged statute is independently
unconstitutional on other grounds.109 This precedent is premised on
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Society, 503 U.S. 429, (1992), which held that “amended” or
changed environmental laws applicable to a specific case did not
violate the constitutional prerogatives of the courts.110
Likening the present case to Robertson, the Ninth Circuit
found “that Congress has directed an agency to take particular action
challenged in pending litigation by changing the law applicable to
that case.”111 Nevertheless, the court found that Congress did not
repeal any part of the ESA.112 Rather, the court reasoned, Congress
ordered that no statute, including the ESA, would apply to the FWS’s
delisting rule once reissued.113 Congress thus amended the law which
governs that agency’s action.114 Noting that the Supreme Court has
made it clear that such amendments, as opposed to repeals, do not

105

Alliance II, 672 F.3d at 1171.
Id. at 1175.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Alliance II, 672 F.3d at 1174.
111 Id. at 1175.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
106
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constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, Section
1713 was found to be valid.115
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
National Association of Manufacturers v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2012 WL 691535 (D.D.C. 2012)
Synopsis:
In National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) exceeded its authority. The NLRB issued
a rule on August 25, 2011 that requires employers subject to the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to clearly post a notice in
specified locations. While the court upheld the NLRB’s authority to
make rules requiring such posting, its authority was exceeded when it
deemed a failure to comply with the posting rule an unfair labor
practice.
Facts and Analysis:
Congress has granted the NLRB the “authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by
National Labor Relations Act such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this National Labor Relations
Act.”116 Pursuant to this authority, the NLRB issued a rule on August
25, 2011 that requires employers under its authority to post notice of
the rights of employees to organize into unions, bargain collectively,
discuss wages, benefits and working conditions, jointly complain,
and strike and picket, along with contact information for the NLRB
and information regarding enforcement procedures.117 The posting
must be: in a conspicuous place, where other notices to employees
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are customarily posted, and on electronic sites if the employer
customarily communicates through such means.118
Moreover, if twenty percent or more of the workforce is not
proficient in English and speaks a language other than English, the
notice must be written in the language employees speak.119 Failure to
comply with these rules was to be deemed unfair labor practices.120
The National Association of Manufacturers challenged the
new rule in a federal District Court on four grounds.121 First, they
argued that the NLRA does not grant the NLRB the authority to
require employers to post a notification of employee rights. Second,
that the NLRB’s powers are triggered when some complaint or
petition is filed and not before.122 Third, that the NLRB is not
permitted to establish a new unfair labor practice absent statutory
authority.123 And finally, that the new regulation allows employee to
file unfair labor practice charges after the statute of limitations has
expired.124
Holding:
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
the NLRB had exceeded its authority and correspondingly struck
down part of the rule.125 The court first noted that Congress
“expressly [granted] the Board the broad rulemaking authority to
make rules necessary to carry out any of the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act.” Further, the court found the posting
requirement to be appropriate and reasonable under the authority
granted to it.126 However, it was held that the NLRB exceeded its
authority by deeming the failure to comply with post requirement an
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unfair labor practice.127 The court also agreed with the plaintiff as to
the statute of limitation issue.128
With respect to the NLRB’s ability to make rules requiring
employers to post notices, the court found that Congress did not
unambiguously intend to preclude the agency from promulgating
such rules, which inform employees of their rights under the
NLRA.129 The text of the statute, the court reasoned, could not justify
such a narrow interpretation of the NLRB’s authority.130
On the other hand, the court found that the NLRB did exceed
its authority it classifying a violation of the posting requirement as an
unfair labor practice.131 The court reasoned that the new rule makes
the failure to post a per se violation.132 The court explained that
violations must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and instructed
the NLRB to “make a specific finding based on the facts and
circumstances in the individual case before it that the failure to post
interfered with the employee's exercise of his or her rights.”133In
addition, the NLRB exceeded its authority because the new rules
tolling provisions “substantially amends the statute of limitations that
Congress expressly set out in the statute.”134
As some provisions of the rule were found to be valid and
others invalid, the court turned to the issue of severability.135
Although the rule lacked a severability clause, the court found the
provisions were capable of standing alone and were not
intertwined.136 Thus, the court held that the agency would have
adopted the severed portion on its own and only struck down the
portions of the rule where the NLRB exceeded its authority.137
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